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Abstract. We propose an interactive message authentication protocol (IMAP) using two
channels: an insecure broadband channel and an authenticated narrow-band channel. We
consider the problem in the context of ad hoc networks, where it is assumed that there is
neither a secret key shared among the two parties, nor a public-key infrastructure in place.
The security of our IMAP is based on the existence of Interactive-Collision Resistant (ICR)
hash functions, a new notion of hash function security.
Our IMAP is based on the computational assumption that ICR hash functions exist. It
performs better than message authentication protocols that are based on computational as-
sumptions. That is, while achieving the same level of security, the amount of information
sent over the authenticated channel in our IMAP is smaller than the most secure IMAP and
Non-interactive Message Authentication Protocol (NIMAP) in the literature. In other words,
if we send the same amount of information over the authenticated channel, we can allow much
stronger adversaries compared to the existing protocols in the literature.
Moreover, our IMAP beneﬁts from a simple structure and works under fewer security as-
sumptions compared to other IMAPs in the literature. The eﬃcient and easy-to-use structure
of our IMAP makes it very practical in real world ad hoc network scenarios.
Keywords: Two-channel Cryptography, Authenticated Channel, Message Authentication,
Hash Functions.
1. Introduction
Message authentication, entity authentication, and data conﬁdentiality are the cornerstones
of secure communication and constitute the fundamental goals of cryptography. When com-
municating over a potentially insecure channel, the parties would like to be assured of the
authenticity of information they obtain, as well as the identity of the sender.
An ad-hoc network is a network where some of the users are part of the network only for a
short period of time.
For practical reasons, it should be possible to quickly add new users to an ad hoc network.
In this network, like any other network, it is desirable to have message authentication, entity
authentication, and data conﬁdentiality. However, these properties might not be equally de-
sirable compared to one another. For instance, it might be less important to provide entity
authentication, as compared to message authentication, because an ad hoc network permits
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users to easily join the network or leave the network. This fact has led the research in this area
more towards providing tools for message authentication.
Standard models of public-key cryptography and secret-key cryptography have addressed
the three fundamental goals of cryptography by means of public-key infrastructures, secure
channels, etc. However, in ad hoc networks where some users are part of the network only for a
short period of time, assuming these traditional settings might not be practical. For instance,
presuming a public-key infrastructure or any secure channel may not be cost eﬃcient.
In search of a solution to the problem of message authentication in ad hoc networks, Rivest
and Shamir [9] suggested using the human voice in an authentication protocol. They consider
a scenario where the two parties want to authenticate a key in the absence of any trusted third
party or previously distributed shared secret. Their authentication protocol is based on the
assumption that the two parties can recognize each other’s voices. Rivest and Shamir proposed
incorporating human abilities in designing authentication protocols in 1984 and, indeed, such a
communication assumption can be applied to many real life scenarios. However, this idea did
not receive serious attention from researchers until very recently.
To make our protocols more useful in a practical ad hoc setting, we consider a model where
no public-key infrastructure exists and no shared secret is assumed. Two small devices wish to
establish a secure key in such an environment by communicating over an insecure broadband
channel and an authenticated narrow-band channel. The authenticated channel might be based
on information transmitted by human beings as users of the two devices. This short string is
going be used to authenticate the information sent over the broadband channel. This model is
described in detail in [3] and [2].
Reading a short string from one device and inputting it into the other device, or comparing
two short strings from two devices, are examples of human aided authenticated channels. In-
frared (IR), laser, near ﬁeld communication (NFC) developed by Sony and Phillips, or visible
light between the two devices can be used to send a short string. One can also require the two
devices to physically touch each other. There is a cost associated to equipping the devices with
the appropriate signal transmitter and receiver. However, using these signals has the advantage
of essentially eliminating the human error factor.
Following the idea of Rivest and Shamir [9] in using human aided channels as the authen-
ticated channel, there have been interactive message authentication protocols (IMAP) and
noninteractive message authentication protocols (NIMAP) proposed in the literature.
1.1. Previous NIMAPs. Hash based NIMAPs ﬁrst appeared in [10] as ﬁngerprints of public
keys in PGP. Later, Balfanz et al proposed a NIMAP in [1]. They require to send 160 bits
over the narrow-band channel. It is desirable to reduce the amount of information sent over
the authenticated channel.
Gehrmann, Mitchell and Nyberg [2] proposed several protocols which they called MANA I,
MANA II, etc. The original version of this protocol is not a NIMAP and requires conﬁdentiality
in the authenticated channel. Vaudenay proposed a noninteractive version of MANA I in [11].
He has also proved that a “stall-free” authenticated channel is enough to ensure the security of
MANA I.
The next NIMAP was proposed by Pasini and Vaudenay [8] using second-preimage resistant
hash functions and commitment schemes in the Common Reference String (CRS) model, where
it is assumed that a random key Kp is previously distributed to all users. The key Kp, like
any other public key, must be authenticated. Moreover, the use of commitment schemes makesA TWO-CHANNEL INTERACTIVE MAP BASED ON ICR HASH FUNCTIONS 3
this NIMAP somewhat complicated, especially when compared to other NIMAPs that just use
hash functions.
Mashatan and Stinson [5] and [6] recently provided a formal model for NIMAPs in general,
along with a new NIMAP. They explored the essential properties of a general NIMAP using two
channels and proved that any NIMAP having certain properties will be secure. The particular
NIMAP proposed by them relies on a new property of hash functions named “hybrid-collision
resistance”. This NIMAP achieves the level of security of the Pasini and Vaudenay NIMAP,
while it beneﬁts from an eﬃcient and easy to use structure. For further analysis and comparison
among NIMAPs, we refer the reader to [5] and [6].
1.2. Previous IMAPs. A noninteractive protocol is, in general, preferred to an interactive
protocol if they are achieving the exact same goals. In other words, interactive protocols
are supposed to either achieve better security or be more eﬃcient than their noninteractive
competitors, otherwise, one would choose to implement noninteractive protocols and obtain the
same results. For instance, having a bidirectional channel may cost more than a unidirectional
channel, or devices may have diﬀerent computational capabilities, allowing one device to be
the master and the other be the slave in the communication. However, we note that NIMAPs
achieve a strictly weaker notion of security when compared to IMAPs. This is because NIMAPs
provably cannot protect against replay attacks of the authenticated ﬂow, while IMAPs can.
The IMAP presented in this paper is based on a computational assumption. As a result, we
can only compare its security and eﬃciency to similar IMAPs that are based on computational
assumptions. There are unconditionally secure IMAPs in the literature; see for example [7].
Hoepman [4] proposed an authenticated key agreement protocol that uses both a bidirectional
narrow-band channel and a bidirectional broadband channel. This interactive protocol consists
of a commitment exchange, an authentication exchange, and ﬁnally a decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
problem in a group G. The security is based on the hardness of the decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
problem in G and on two hash functions H1 and H2 having a very speciﬁc structure. In [11], it
is discussed that instances of such hash functions may not exist at all.
Vaudenay [11] proposed an IMAP based on equivocable or extractable commitment schemes.
This protocol achieves a good level of security. However, the only eﬃcient commitment schemes,
with the speciﬁc properties required here, are in the random oracle model. There are other
instances of such commitment schemes in the standard model, but the number of rounds is
logarithmic in terms of the security parameters and it involves zero-knowledge proofs. Also,
there are some eﬃcient commitment schemes with the appropriate properties in the Common
Random String (CRS) model. However, the CRS model might not be suitable in an ad hoc
setting where it is not practical to authentically distribute a random string to every user. We
note that, the possibility that the adversary does online computations has not been considered
in this protocol.
1.3. Our contributions. We construct a new IMAP using two channels based on Interactive-
Collision Resistant (ICR) hash functions. Our protocol has a very simple structure and does
not require any long strings to be distributed ahead of time. We allow oﬄine attacks by an
adversary, as well as replay attacks. The attack model is the adaptive chosen plain-text attack
(ACPA) model. Both substitution and impersonation attacks are analyzed in this model. The
ACPA model is a strong model, and as a result, a scheme that is proven secure in this model does
not require authenticated channels that have any unusual properties. In the ACPA model, the
adversary has oﬄine computational power and can make the users send messages of adversary’s
choice. In this paper, we give further power to the adversaries by allowing them to have online4 ATEFEH MASHATAN AND DOUGLAS R. STINSON
computational power. That is, they are allowed to do hash function computations, or make
oracle queries, while they are in the middle of an attack.
The simplicity of the structure and the generality of the security model makes our protocol
applicable in a wide variety of real-world settings where ad hoc networks have no trusted
infrastructure. For instance, it can be used in pairing of wireless devices such as Wireless
USB and Bluetooth, in Personal Area Networks (PANs), or in a disaster case where a trusted
infrastructure has been compromised.
We analyze the security and eﬃciency of our IMAP and show that the performance of our
IMAP is better than other IMAPs and NIMAPs proposed so far. In other words, our IMAP
achieves a better level of security, while beneﬁtting from an eﬃcient structure and having to
send fewer bits over the authenticated channel. To reiterate, if we want to send the same amount
of information, then we can assume much stronger adversaries in terms of online computational
complexity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the attack model, i.e., adversarial
goal and capabilities, are deﬁned. In Section 3, Interactive-Collision Resistance (ICR), a new
notion for hash function security, is deﬁned and analyzed. Finally, an IMAP based on ICR
hash functions is proposed. We prove in Section 4 that our IMAP is secure given that we use
ICR hash functions. The security of our IMAP is analyzed in Section 4. Finally, we comment
on parameter sizes for our IMAP in 5. We conclude with listing the advantages of our IMAP
in Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2. The communication Model and The Attack Model
We assume that two channels are accessible for communication: an insecure broadband
channel, denoted by →, and an authenticated narrow-band channel, denoted by ⇒. The latter
is sometimes referred to as the manual channel. Communication over the authenticated channel
is usually more expensive and less accessible. Hence, the messages sent over the authenticated
channel are ideally much shorter than those sent over the insecure channel. The goal is to
employ both of these channels in a message authentication protocol.
The adversary has full control over the broadband channel. That is, the adversary can listen
to any messages sent over the broadband channel, modify the messages sent via this channel,
stall the message from being delivered, and initiate a new message in this channel at any time.
On the other hand, we assume that the adversary’s control over the authenticated channel
is limited. In particular, the adversary cannot modify the information transmitted over the
authenticated channel, i.e., data integrity is ensured in this channel. However, it is still possible
to read, delay or remove the message from this channel. Moreover, the adversary can replay
a previous ﬂow of this channel. Furthermore, the authenticated channel is equipped with user
authenticating features such that the recipient of the information can be sure about who sent
it.
NIMAPs and IMAPs deploy both narrow-band and broadband channels between a claimant
Alice and a veriﬁer Bob. Alice chooses a message M ∈ M, the space of all acceptable messages,
and sends it to Bob using a NIMAP or an IMAP. At the end, Bob either outputs (Alice, M0),
where M0 ∈ M, or he rejects. In the absence of an active adversary, the message M sent from
Alice should be recovered by Bob, making him accept and output (Alice, M). This message M
could be a key that is going to be used for further communication.
We now deﬁne the attack model, adversarial goal and capabilities. The adversary is trying to
make Bob accept a message M0 along with the identity of Alice, when in fact the message M0
was never sent by Alice to Bob. That is, the adversarial goal is to make Bob output (Alice, M0)A TWO-CHANNEL INTERACTIVE MAP BASED ON ICR HASH FUNCTIONS 5
when he was supposed to reject. There are two main types of attacks to consider: impersonation
attacks and substitution attacks.
In an impersonation attack, the adversary initiates a session and tries to convince Bob that
a message M0 is sent from Alice, while in fact M0 was never sent from Alice. In our model,
the attacker cannot initiate a new authenticated ﬂow. Hence, the authenticated ﬂow in an
impersonation attack constitutes of a replay of a previous authenticated ﬂow sent by Alice.
On the other hand, a substitution attack occurs when Alice initiates a session with Bob,
and tries to send him a message M. Then, the attacker substitutes M0 instead of M, so,
Bob receives M0 and not M. The authenticated ﬂow cannot be substituted according to the
model, and hence any potential changes occur in the broadband channel. There are two types
of substitution attacks; see Section 4.
Moreover, we assume that the adversary can make Alice send a message that the adversary
has chosen. This ability of the adversary may not be considered in all models. We do consider
it in our model since it makes the adversary more powerful and results in a stronger level of
security. The adaptive chosen plaintext attack (ACPA) model is very strong and desirable
compared to other models. It consists of two stages: an information gathering stage and a
deception stage. In addition, we assume that the attacker has precomputing capabilities and is
able to mount “dictionary-type” attacks.
The term oﬄine complexity is used to refer to the computational complexity Toﬀ = 2toﬀ of
an adversary up to and including the information gathering stage. The term online complexity
refers to the computational complexity Ton = 2ton of an adversary during the deception stage
of a substitution attack. Furthermore, the number of messages sent by Alice to Bob during the
information gathering stage is denoted by q.
In the information gathering stage, the adversary is allowed to adaptively choose q messages
and make Alice send them to Bob. The communication is then recorded for further use. The
adversary hopes that this stage of an attack gradually reveals information about the unknown
aspects of the protocol.
The deception stage happens after the information gathering phase. The attacker tries to
make Bob accept a message M0 along with the identity of Alice, when he was supposed to
reject. We note that the message M0 should be diﬀerent from all the messages previously sent
by Alice, otherwise, we consider the “attack” only a “replay”.
3. A new Interactive Message Authentication Protocol.
We begin by deﬁning new notions of hash function security called Interactive-Collision Re-
sistance (ICR). We continue by introducing a new IMAP based on ICR hash functions. The
security of this IMAP is based on the hardness of the ICR problems.
3.1. Interactive-Collision Resistance. In this section, we begin by deﬁning Interactive-
Collision Resistance I, II and III (ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII respectively) for hash functions.
Then, we state and prove three lemmas about the security of ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII hash
functions.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that the problem of ﬁnding interactive-collisions of
type I, II, and III are being investigated. We analyze the ICRI, ICRII, and ICRIII Games in
the Random Oracle Model. This analysis yields some insight about the hardness of these games6 ATEFEH MASHATAN AND DOUGLAS R. STINSON
compared to Collision Resistance (CR)1 or Second-Preimage Resistance (SPR)2. Note that, we
do not have any concrete constructions for designing such hash functions in the standard model.
We pose this as an open problem.
Deﬁnition 1. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant I (ICRI) if the game of
Figure 1 is hard to win, for ﬁxed values of `1,`2, and `3. In addition, the pair (MkKkR0,M0kK0kR)
is called an interactive-collision of type I. Furthermore, we call H a (Toﬀ,1)-ICRI hash func-
tion if an adversary, who can make up to Toﬀ hash function computations, wins the ICRI game
with probability at most 1.
Oscar Challenger
Choose M, |M| = `1
M − − − − − − →
K ← − − − − − − Choose K ∈ {0,1}
`2 uniformly at random
Choose R
0, |R
0| = `3
R
0
− − − − − − →
Choose M
0, |M
0| = `1
M
0
− − − − − − →
Choose K
0, |K
0| = `2
K
0
− − − − − − →
R ← − − − − − − Choose R ∈ {0,1}
`3 uniformly at random
Oscar wins if H(MkKkR
0) = H(M
0kK
0kR)
and MkKkR
0 6= M
0kK
0kR.
Figure 1. ICRI Game
Note that, if `2 = `3 = 0, then ICRI is equivalent to Collision Resistance (CR). Further,
if `1 = `3 = 0, then ICRI is equivalent to Second-Preimage Resistant (SPR). In fact, ICRI
is interpolating between CR and SPR. This suggests that, solving ICRI Game is harder than
ﬁnding collisions, but not harder than ﬁnding second-preimages.
We can analyze the security of ICRI hash functions, or in other words the hardness of the
ICRI Game, in the random oracle model. This will give us an intuition on how diﬃcult this
game is, as compared to former notions of hash function security. Let FX,Y denote the set of
all functions from a domain X to a range Y.
Lemma 1. Let X = {0,1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size `1 + `2 + `3.
Consider a hash function H chosen randomly from FX,Y, where |Y| = 2k. Then, H is a
(2toﬀ,1)-ICRI hash function in the Random Oracle model, where 1 = 2−k(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 +
2toﬀ−`3). In other words, any player with computational complexity Toﬀ = 2toﬀ against the
challenger of the ICRI Game has a probability of success at most 1 = 2−k(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 +
2toﬀ−`3).
We consider X = {0,1}`1+`2+`3, the set of all possible binary strings of size `1 +`2 +`3, and
let a hash function H be chosen randomly from FX,Y, where |Y| = 2k.
Assume that we are only permitted oracle access to H, that is we are working in the random
oracle model. We let the adversary have access to the Random Oracle for Toﬀ = 2toﬀ times.
Given these conditions, we are looking for the probability 1 of Oscar winning the ICRI Game.
1A hash function is collision resistant if it is hard to ﬁnd two inputs that hash to the same output
2A hash function h is Second-Preimage Resistant, if given an input x, it is hard to ﬁnd another input, y, x 6= y,
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Let X = {X1,X2,...,XToﬀ} be the queries of Oscar to the random oracle, where |Xi| =
`1 + `2 + `3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ Toﬀ. Without loss of generality, we assume that Xis are distinct, for
1 ≤ i,j ≤ Toﬀ.
Consider the pair (Y,Y 0) = (MkKkR0,M0kK0kR), the interactive-collision found by Oscar,
and write Xis in the form of Xi = MikKikR0
i, where |Mi| = `1, |Ki| = `2 and |R0
i| = `3.
Let E denote the event that H(Y ) = H(Y 0) and D denote the event that a colliding pair
(Xi,Xj) exists, Xi,Xj ∈ X. We want to ﬁnd an upper bound on Pr[E]. We will do this by
conditioning on the event D:
Pr[E] = Pr[¬D] × Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[D] × Pr[E|D]
≤ Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[D] × Pr[E|D]
= Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[DandE].
Denote 11 = Pr[E|¬D] and 12 = Pr[DandE]. We will compute upper bounds on 11 and
12.
Let D1 denote the event that Y / ∈ X, yet it collides with Y 0 = Xk, for some Xk ∈ X.
11 = Pr[E|¬D]
= Pr[¬D1] × Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] + Pr[D1] × Pr[E|¬DandD1]
≤ Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] + Pr[D1] × Pr[E|¬DandD1].
The probability that H(Y ) = H(Y 0) when Y does not collide with any of the precomputed
values is 2−k due to the properties of random oracles. Hence, Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] = 2−k.
The probability that Y is not a precomputed value, yet it collides with a precomputed value
Y 0 = Xk, is Toﬀ = 2toﬀ2−k. At this point Oscar hopes that he gets the “correct” R value from
the Challenger. Hence, Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] = 2toﬀ−k−`3. Hence, we obtain 11 ≤ 2−k+2toﬀ−k−`3
Let D2 denote the event that Y ∈ {Xi,Xj} and Y 0 ∈ {Xi,Xj} \ Y .
12 = Pr[DandE]
= Pr[¬D2] × Pr[DandE|¬D2] + Pr[D1] × Pr[DandE|D2]
≤ Pr[DandE|¬D1] + Pr[D2] × Pr[DandE|D2]
= Pr[DandE|¬D2] + Pr[E andDandD2].
When there is a colliding pair in X, yet the colliding pair is not equal to neither (Y,Y 0)
nor (Y 0,Y ), the probability that H(Y ) = H(Y 0) is 2−k in the random oracle model. Hence,
Pr[DandE|¬D2] = 2−k.
When D,D2 and E occur at the same time, it means that Y = MkKkR0 and Y 0 = M0kK0kR
are among the precomputed values by Oscar. That is a collision is found among the Toﬀ
queried values, Oscar is sending M,M0,K0, and R0, and he is hoping to get the “correct” R
and K from the Challenger. We know that the probability of ﬁnding a collision among Toﬀ
random values is
 Toﬀ
2

/2k. This is approximately equal to 22toﬀ−k−1 when Toﬀ = 2toﬀ. Having
found a colliding pair (Xi,Xj), Oscar lets (Y,Y 0) = (Xi,Xj) or (Y,Y 0) = (Xj,Xi). Then,
the probability that the “correct” K and R are chosen is 2−`2−`3. Hence, we conclude that
Pr[E andDandD2] = 22toﬀ−k−`2−`3. This concludes that 12 ≤ 2−k + 22toﬀ−k−`2−`3.8 ATEFEH MASHATAN AND DOUGLAS R. STINSON
The above discussion concludes the proof of Lemma 1. To reiterate the Lemma, one can say
that any player with computational complexity Toﬀ = 2toﬀ against the challenger of the ICRI
Game has a probability of success at most 1 = 2−k(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3).
We now deﬁne Interactive-Collision Resistance II.
Deﬁnition 2. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant II (ICRII) if the game
of Figure 2 is hard to win, for ﬁxed values of `1,`2, and `3. The pair (MkKkR0,M0kK0kR)
is called an interactive-collision of type II. Furthermore, we call H a (Toﬀ,Ton,2)-ICRII hash
function if an adversary with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ and online complexity Ton wins the ICRII
Game with probability at most 2.
Oscar Challenger
Choose M, |M| = `1
M − − − − − − →
K ← − − − − − − Choose K ∈ {0,1}
`2 uniformly at random
Choose M
0, |M
0| = `1
M
0
− − − − − − →
Choose K
0, |K
0| = `2
K
0
− − − − − − →
R ← − − − − − − Choose R ∈ {0,1}
`3 uniformly at random
Choose R
0, |R
0| = `3
R
0
− − − − − − →
Oscar wins if H(MkKkR
0) = H(M
0kK
0kR)
and MkKkR
0 6= M
0kK
0kR.
Figure 2. ICRII Game
Next, we deﬁne Interactive-Collision Resistant III (ICRIII).
Deﬁnition 3. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant III (ICRIII) if the game
of Figure 3 is hard to win, for ﬁxed values of `1,`2, and `3. The pair (MkKkR0,M0kK0kR) is
called an interactive-collision of type III. Furthermore, we call H a (Toﬀ,Ton,3)-ICRIII hash
function if an adversary with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ and online complexity Ton wins the ICRIII
Game with probability at most 3.
Oscar Challenger
Choose M
0, |M
0| = `1
M
0
− − − − − − →
Choose K
0, |K
0| = `2
K
0
− − − − − − →
R ← − − − − − − Choose R ∈ {0,1}
`3 uniformly at random
Choose M, |M| = `1
M − − − − − − →
K ← − − − − − − Choose K ∈ {0,1}
`2 uniformly at random
Choose R
0, |R
0| = `3
R
0
− − − − − − →
Oscar wins if H(MkKkR
0) = H(M
0kK
0kR)
and MkKkR
0 6= M
0kK
0kR.
Figure 3. ICRIII GameA TWO-CHANNEL INTERACTIVE MAP BASED ON ICR HASH FUNCTIONS 9
As in ICRI, if `2 = `3 = 0, then ICRII and ICRIII are equivalent to Collision Resistance. As
a result, we conclude that ﬁnding collisions is not harder than ﬁnding interactive-collisions of
type II and III.
Similar to ICRI, we analyze the security of ICRII and ICRIII hash functions in the random
oracle model to have an intuition on how diﬃcult it is win ICRII or ICRIII Games.
Lemma 2. Let X = {0,1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size `1 + `2 +
`3. Consider a hash function H chosen randomly from FX,Y, where |Y| = 2k. Then, H
is a (2toﬀ,2ton,2)-ICRII hash function in the Random Oracle model, where 2 = 2−k(1 +
22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3 + 2ton). In other words, any player with oﬄine computational complexity
Toﬀ = 2toﬀ and online complexity Ton = 2ton against the challenger of the ICRII Game has a
probability of success at most 2 = 2−k(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3 + 2ton).
Lemma 3. Let X = {0,1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size `1 + `2 +
`3. Consider a hash function H chosen randomly from FX,Y, where |Y| = 2k. Then, H
is a (2toﬀ,2ton,3)-ICRIII hash function in the Random Oracle model, where 3 = 2−k(1 +
22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3 + 2ton). In other words, any player with oﬄine computational complexity
Toﬀ = 2toﬀ and online complexity Ton = 2ton against the challenger of the ICRIII Game has a
probability of success at most 3 = 2−k(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3 + 2ton).
The proof of these lemmas are similar and we only prove Lemma 2 here.
Let H again be a random oracle and assume that the adversary can access the Random
Oracle for up to Toﬀ = 2toﬀ times before he receives the last ﬂow from the Challenger, i.e. R
in the ICRII and K in the ICRIII. Furthermore, he can access the Random Oracle for up to
Ton = 2ton times after he receives the last ﬂow from the Challenger and before he sends the
value of R0. We now ﬁnd an upper bound on the probability 2 of Oscar winning the ICRII
Game.
Let the pair (Y,Y 0) = (MkKkR0,M0kK0kR) be the interactive-collision of type II found
by Oscar. Further, let X = {X1,...,XToﬀ} be Oscar’s inputs to the random oracle before
he receives the value of R from the Challenger, and Y = {Y1,...,YTon} be his inputs to the
random oracle after he received the value of R. Without loss of generality, we assume that
X1,...,XToﬀ,Y1,...,YTon are all distinct. We write each Xi or Yi in the form of MikKikR0
i,
where |Mi| = `1, |Ki| = `2 and |R0
i| = `3.
Let E denote the event that H(Y ) = H(Y 0) and D denote the event that a colliding pair
(Xi,Xj) exists, Xi,Xj ∈ X. We want to ﬁnd an upper bound on Pr[E]. This is done by
conditioning on the event D:
Pr[E] = Pr[¬D] × Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[D] × Pr[E|D]
≤ Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[D] × Pr[E|D]
= Pr[E|¬D] + Pr[DandE].
Denote 21 = Pr[E|¬D] and 22 = Pr[DandE]. We note that 22 is found by the same
argument we used in the proof of Lemma 1 for ﬁnding 12. Hence, 22 ≤ 2−k + 22toﬀ−k−`2−`3.
We now ﬁnd an upper bound on 21 = Pr[E|¬D].
Let D1 denote the event that Y / ∈ X, yet it collides with Y 0 = Xk, for some Xk ∈ X.10 ATEFEH MASHATAN AND DOUGLAS R. STINSON
11 = Pr[E|¬D]
= Pr[¬D1] × Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] + Pr[D1] × Pr[E|¬DandD1]
≤ Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] + Pr[D1] × Pr[E|¬DandD1].
The probability that Y is not a precomputed value, but collides with a precomputed value
Y 0 = Xk, is Toﬀ = 2toﬀ2−k. At this point Oscar hopes that he gets the “correct” R value from
the Challenger. Hence, Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] = 2toﬀ−k−`3.
It remains to ﬁnd Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1]. We ﬁnd this by conditioning on the event D2 which
we deﬁne to be the case when Y ∈ Y.
Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1] = Pr[D2] × Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1 andD2]
+ Pr[¬D2] × Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1 and¬D2]
≤ Pr[D2] × Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1 andD2] + Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1 and¬D2]
The probability that Y and Y 0 collide while Y / ∈ X and Y / ∈ Y is 2−k in the random oracle
model. Hence, Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1 and¬D2] = 2−k.
When Y ∈ Y, Oscar has 2ton choices for Y and then, the probability that Y collides with a
determined Y 0 is 2ton−k. Hence, Pr[D2] × Pr[E|¬Dand¬D1 andD2] = 2ton−k.
This concludes that 22 ≤ 2toﬀ−k−`3 + 2ton−k + 2−k.
This proves Lemma 2.
Finally, we deﬁne the notion of an Interactive-Collision Resistant hash function.
Deﬁnition 4. A hash function H is Interactive-Collision Resistant (ICR) if the ICRI,
ICRII, and ICRIII Games are both hard to win.
Furthermore, H is said to be a (Toﬀ,Ton,1,2)-ICR hash function if it is a (Toﬀ,1)-ICRI
hash function, a (Toﬀ,Ton,2)-ICRII hash function, and a (Toﬀ,Ton,2)-ICRIII hash function.
3.2. A new Interactive Message Authentication Protocol using ICR hash functions.
Let H be a (Toﬀ,Ton,1,2)-ICR hash function with ﬁxed parameters `1, `2, and `3. We propose
the following IMAP:
1. On input (M, Bob), Alice chooses K ∈ {0,1}`2 uniformly at random and sends MkK
to Bob over the insecure channel.
2. Bob receives M0kK0.
3. Bob chooses R ∈ {0,1}`3 uniformly at random and he sends it to Alice.
4. Alice receives R0.
5. Alice computes h = H(MkKkR0) and sends it over the authenticated channel.
5. Bob receives h0.
6. Bob computes H(M0kK0kR).
7. Bob outputs (Alice, M0) if h0 = H(M0kK0kR), and he rejects otherwise.
This IMAP is illustrated in Figure 4. Next, we prove that this IMAP is secure given that the
three games on Figures 1, 2, and 3 are hard to win. In other words, if H is a (Toﬀ,Ton,1,2)-ICR
hash function, then the IMAP is secure.A TWO-CHANNEL INTERACTIVE MAP BASED ON ICR HASH FUNCTIONS 11
Alice Bob
Input (M, Bob)
Choose K ∈ {0,1}
`2 uniformly at random
MkK
− − − − → Receive M
0kK
0
R ← − − − − Choose R ∈ {0,1}
`3 uniformly at random
Receive R
0 and
Compute h = H(MkKkR
0) h = = = = ⇒ Output (Alice, M
0) if h = H(M
0kK
0kR),
and reject otherwise.
Figure 4. Interactive Message Authentication Protocol
4. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the IMAP presented in Figure 4. We consider
substitution and impersonation attacks separately. Associated with each attack scenario, an
IMAP Game is introduced. Winning this game is equivalent to attacking our proposed IMAP.
Finally, the reduction of the ICRI, and similarly ICRII and ICRIII, to the IMAP Game is
shown.
As was mentioned earlier, the ACPA model consists of an information gathering stage and
the deception stage.
4.1. The Information Gathering Stage. During the information gathering stage, the adver-
sary can change the information sent over the broadband channel. For instance, the adversary
may change R to R0, or K to K0. The other value that is being sent over the broadband channel
is the message M. However, our model allows the adversary to choose the message M to start
with. Hence, there is no need for the adversary to intervene and change it to M0. Since we are
working in the ACPA model, the adversary can make Alice send q messages in the information
gathering stage. This stage is depicted in Figure 5.
As it was mentioned previously, the goal of the adversary in attacking a MAP is to make
the veriﬁer, Bob, accept a message M0 along with the identity of the claimant, Alice, when he
was supposed to reject and, indeed, the message M0 was never sent by Alice to Bob. There
are two main ways of achieving this goal: by mounting impersonation attacks or substitution
attacks. We will prove that a successful impersonation attack translates into winning the ICRI
Game and a successful substitution attack is equivalent to winning either the ICRII Game or
the ICRIII Game.
4.2. Impersonation Attack. Figure 6 depicts the impersonation attack against our IMAP.
Here, the attacker initiates a session herself and tries to convince Bob that a message M0 is sent
from Alice, while in fact M0 was generated by the attacker and Alice never sent M0 to Bob.
According to our model, the data sent over the authenticated channel, although public,
cannot be modiﬁed by the adversary. Hence, Eve can only replay a previous ﬂow sent by Alice,
as shown in Figure 6. The attacker replays one of h1,...,hq. Given that Alice has never sent
M0, the adversarial goal is achieved if Bob accepts.
4.2.1. IMAP Game Against Impersonation Attacks. We now prove that our IMAP is secure
against impersonation attacks mounted by an adversary who has oﬄine computational power
Toﬀ given that H is a (Toﬀ,1)-ICRI hash function. In other words, an adversary who can attack
the IMAP by mounting an impersonation attack with non-negligible probability can also win
the ICRI Game with non-negligible probability.12 ATEFEH MASHATAN AND DOUGLAS R. STINSON
Alice Eve Bob
Choose M1 or get it from Eve
M1kK1
− − − − − → Substitute
M1kK
0
1 − − − − − →
R
0
1 ← − − − − − Substitute
R1 ← − − − − −
Compute h1 = H(M1kK1kR
0
1)
h1 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ⇒
Choose M2 or get it from Eve
M2kK2
− − − − − → Substitute
M2kK
0
2 − − − − − →
R
0
2 ← − − − − − Substitute
R2 ← − − − − −
Compute h2 = H(M2kK2kR
0
2)
h2 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ⇒
. . .
. . .
Choose Mq or get it from Eve
MqkKq
− − − − − → Substitute
MqkK
0
q
− − − − − →
R
0
q
← − − − − − Substitute
Rq
← − − − − −
Compute hq = H(MqkKqkR
0
q)
hq
= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ⇒
Figure 5. Information Gathering Phase of an Attack
Eve Bob
Input (M
0, Bob)
M
0kK
0
− − − − → Receive M
0kK
0
R
0
← − − − − Choose R
0 ∈ {0,1}
`2
Receive R
0 uniformly at random
Send h = hi = H(MikKikR
0
i) for h = = = = ⇒ Output (Alice, M
0) if h = H(M
0kK
0kR
0), for
some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q. and reject otherwise.
Figure 6. An Impersonation Attack Against IMAP
Consider the game illustrated in Figure 7. If Eve wins this game with probability , then
obviously we can translate the game into an attack against our IMAP with success probability
. As a result, this game is named the “IMAP Game”. Here, Eve is simulating the adversary
of the IMAP and is facing a challenger who is simulating Alice and Bob at the same time.
The ﬁrst q rounds, analogous to the information gathering stage of an attack, consist of Eve
sending messages Mi and the challenger responding with Ki. This part is simulating the ﬁrst
ﬂow sent by Alice.
Eve is allowed to change the values sent by Alice and Bob sent over the insecure channel,
that is Ki and Ri. Note that hi = H(MikKikR0
i). Hence, the values of K0
i and Ri are redundant
in the analysis of the impersonation attack.
In the last round of the game, corresponding to the deception phase, Eve sends M0kK0,
M0 6= Mi for every i ∈ {1,...,q}. After receiving a random value R from the challenger, sheA TWO-CHANNEL INTERACTIVE MAP BASED ON ICR HASH FUNCTIONS 13
Eve Challenger
Choose M1
M1 − − − − − − − − − − →
K1 ← − − − − − − − − − − Choose K1
Choose R
0
1
R
0
1 − − − − − − − − − − →
. . .
. . .
. . .
Choose Mq
Mq
− − − − − − − − − − →
Kq
← − − − − − − − − − − Choose Kq
Choose R
0
q
R
0
q
− − − − − − − − − − →
Choose M
0 and K
0 M
0kK
0
− − − − − − − − − − →
R ← − − − − − − − − − − Choose R
Deﬁne hi = H(MikKikR
0
i)
hi − − − − − − − − − − → Eve wins if Mi 6= M
0
for some i ∈ {1,...,q} and hi = H(M
0kK
0kR).
Figure 7. IMAP Game Against Impersonation Attacks
sends hi = H(MikKikR0
i), for some i ∈ {1,...,q}. Eve wins the game if hi = H(M0kK0kR) for
Mi 6= M0.
The following Theorem reduces the ICRI Game to the IMAP Game against impersonation
attacks.
Theorem 1. Let H be a (Toﬀ,1)-ICRI hash function. Then, any adversary against the IMAP of
Figure 4 with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ who makes q message queries and mounts an impersonation
attack, has a probability of success p at most q1.
Assuming that Eve wins the IMAP Game of Figure 7 with non-negligible probability, we can
employ her in the ICRI Game depicted in Figure 1. In this reduction, Eve is playing against
her IMAP Game Challenger and Oscar is playing against his ICRI Game Challenger. The
result of the IMAP Game, played by Eve, is going to be used in the ICRI Game, played by
Oscar. Oscar begins by choosing a random value j ∈ {1,...,q}. Then, he lets Eve continue
playing against the IMAP Challenger. Oscar does not interrupt the ﬂows between Eve and her
challenger except when t = j. For t = j, Oscar forwards Mj to the ICRI Challenger. Then, the
challenger responds with K. Oscar sends K = Kj to Eve. Oscar gets R0 from Eve and sends it
to the ICRI Challenger.
At the deception stage, Eve sends M0 and K0. Oscar sends M0 to his challenger and receives
R. He then sends R to Eve. Eve responds with a value hi, i ∈ {1,...,q}. Eve wins if
hi = H(M0kK0kR). If i = j and Eve wins, then Oscar wins the ICRI Game, and Oscar loses
otherwise.
If we assume that Eve can win IMAP Game with probability , then Oscar wins the ICRI
Game with probability /q.
When q = 1, adversaries with probability of success 2−k clearly exist, and hence, the reduction
is tight. For q 6= 1, the probability of success is q2−k. This factor q appears as a consequence
of considering strong adversaries who can request q messages to be sent by Alice. Some papers14 ATEFEH MASHATAN AND DOUGLAS R. STINSON
only consider q = 1 resulting in a weaker notion of security3. However, the approach of many
other papers is similar to our paper4.
Putting Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 together, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let X = {0,1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size `1+`2+`3 and
H be a hash function chosen randomly from FX,Y, where |Y| = 2k. Then, any adversary against
the IMAP of Figure 4, with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ = 2toﬀ who makes up to q message queries and
mounts an impersonation attack, has a probability of success p ≤ q2−k(2+22toﬀ−`2−`3+2toﬀ−`3).
4.3. Substitution Attack. In the substitution attack, unlike the case of impersonation attack,
Alice is actively involved and she would like to authenticate M to Bob. The adversary, on the
other hand, wishes to authenticate M0 to Bob along with the identity of Alice. There are two
cases possible here.
The ﬁrst case is when Alice initiates a session and tries to authenticate M to Bob. Then,
Eve substitutes M0 instead of M. As a result, Bob receives M0 and not M. The value of M0
may be the result of a partial or total modiﬁcation of M by Eve. After receiving R from Bob,
Eve tries to ﬁnd a suitable value R0 which will make Bob accept after receiving h. Figure 8 is
illustrating this scenario against our IMAP.
Alice Eve Bob
Input (M, Bob)
MkK
− − − − − − → Substitute
M
0kK
0
− − − − − − →
R
0
← − − − − − − Substitute R ← − − − − − −
Compute h = H(MkKkR
0) h = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ⇒ If H(M
0kK
0kR) = h, output
(Alice, M
0), reject otherwise.
Figure 8. Substitution Attack of Type A Against Our IMAP
The second case is when Eve initiates a ﬂow with Bob while pretending to be Alice. Eve tries
to authenticate M0 to Bob. After receiving R, she does her computations to ﬁnd a suitable
M. Then, she will make Alice initiate a session with Bob with input M. Eve will use the
authenticated ﬂow of this session in her original session with Bob.
4.3.1. The IMAP Game Against Substitution Attacks. Examining the substitution attack of
type A, illustrated in Figure 8, we can write down the following as the order of the ﬂows:
(1) Alice chooses M or gets it from Eve. Eve gets K from Alice.
(2) Eve sends M0 and K0 to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a random value R and sends it to Eve.
(4) Eve chooses a random value R0 and sends it to Alice.
(5) Alice computes h = H(MkKkR0), which is sent to Bob.
Note that the a successful substitution attack of type A directly translates into a successful
player against the ICRII Game. As a result, we get the following theorem.
3See [7] for instance.
4For instance, in [11], it is assumed that q ≤ 2
10 and the reduction is not tight. They also get the same probability
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Alice Eve Bob
Input (M, Bob)
M
0kK
0
− − − − − − →
R ← − − − − − −
M ← − − − − − −
MkK
− − − − − − →
R
0
← − − − − − −
Compute h = H(MkKkR
0) h = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ⇒ If H(M
0kK
0kR) = h, output
(Alice, M
0), reject otherwise.
Figure 9. Another Substitution Attack of Type B Against Our IMAP
Theorem 2. Let H be a (Toﬀ,Ton,2)-ICRII hash function. Then, any adversary against our
IMAP with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ and online complexity Ton, who is mounting a substitution
attack of type A has a probability of success p = 2.
Now we examine the substitution attack of type B, illustrated in Figure 9. The following is
the order of the ﬂows as they happen in this attack scenario:
(1) Eve sends M0 and K0 to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses a random value R and sends it to Eve.
(3) Eve provides Alice with M.
(4) Alice sends M and K to Eve.
(5) Eve chooses a random value R0 and sends it to Alice.
(6) Alice computes h = H(MkKkR0), which is sent to Bob.
A successful substitution attack of type B yields a successful player against the ICRIII Game.
Hence, the following theorem follows.
Theorem 3. Let H be a (Toﬀ,Ton,2)-ICRIII hash function. Then, any adversary against our
IMAP with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ and online complexity Ton, who is mounting a substitution
attack of type B has a probability of success p = 2.
Now combining Lemmas 2 and 3 with Theorems 2 and 3, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let X = {0,1}`1+`2+`3 be the set of all possible binary strings of size `1+`2+`3 and
H be a hash function chosen randomly from FX,Y, where |Y| = 2k. Then, any adversary against
our IMAP, with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ = 2toﬀ and online complexity Ton = 2ton, who is mounting
a substitution attack, has a probability of success p = 2−k(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3 + 2ton).
4.4. Security of our IMAP. The adversary against our IMAP will either mount a substi-
tution attack or an impersonation attack. Hence, the following theorem is a consequence of
Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
Theorem 4. Let X = {0,1}`1+`2+`3 and H be a hash function chosen randomly from FX,Y,
where |Y| = 2k. Then, any adversary against our IMAP, with oﬄine complexity Toﬀ = 2toﬀ
and online complexity Ton = 2ton who can make q message queries, has a probability of success
p ≤ 2−k max(q(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3),2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3 + 2ton).16 ATEFEH MASHATAN AND DOUGLAS R. STINSON
5. Parameter sizes
Theorem 4 says that an adversary attacking our proposed IMAP, using 2toﬀ hash compu-
tations before the deception stage, 2ton hash computations during the deception stage, and q
message queries, has a probability of success at most 2−k max(q(2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3),2 +
22toﬀ−`2−`3 + 2toﬀ−`3 + 2ton).
Here, we ﬁrst target typical5 values for q ≤ 210, toﬀ ≤ 70, and p ≤ 2−20.
If we take `2,`3 ≥ 80, then we can basically ignore the factors (2 + 22toﬀ−`2−`3) and 2toﬀ−`3.
We note that, since R and K are being sent over the insecure channel, this assumption does
not have any impact on the analysis or usefulness of our protocol. We now can simplify the
result of Theorem 4 to p ≤ 2−k max(q,2ton).
Since we want the overall success probability of the adversary be less than or equal to 2−20,
we require that max(q,2ton) ≤ 2k−20.
Hence, letting ton = 10 along with typical parameters q ≤ 210, toﬀ ≤ 70, and p ≤ 2−20, we
get that k ≥ 30. This is a distinct improvement over the previous works.
In [11], k ≥ 50 is required while the same typical parameters are targeted. If we let k = 50,
then we can tolerate much stronger adversaries, compared to [11], [6], and [8], having ton = 30
and q ≤ 230 and still get the same overall success probability of p ≤ 2−20. Note that, we can
allow toﬀ to get bigger as well by just choosing `2 + `3 according to the size of toﬀ.
6. Conclusion
Working in the ACPA model, we assumed that the communication is taking place over two
diﬀerent channels: an insecure broadband channel and an authenticated narrow-band channel.
Having examined the most secure and eﬃcient IMAP found in the literature, we proposed a
new IMAP based on ICR hash functions, a new notion that we have deﬁned. Given a secure
ICR hash function, we proved that our IMAP is secure.
The proposed IMAP of Figure 4 has three ﬂows and utilizes hash functions instead of com-
mitment schemes. This yields an advantage of having a simple and easy to implement structure.
Our security assumptions are reasonable and are based on the existence of an ICR hash
function. We do not require any previously distributed public parameters, which are needed
for commitment schemes.
The amount of information sent over the authenticated channel is smaller than the most
secure IMAP proposed so far, while achieving the same level of security. Allowing the same
amount of information to be sent over the authenticated channel, we can tolerate much stronger
adversaries.
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